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MODIFICATION OF THE FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENT
FOR IMPEACHING WITNESSES: CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 770
Section 770 of the new California Evidence Code embodies a significantly
modified foundational requirement for the impeachment of a witness by inconsistent statements.' Briefly stated, a foundation is no longer required for admission
of extrinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement. 2 Instead, the foundation survives as an alternative procedure to be followed when the impeacher so elects.
This note undertakes to examine this modified rule, its merits, and some of the
potential problems that may arise in applying it.
The traditional rule for the impeachment of witnesses by prior inconsistent
statements was stated in section 2052 of the California Code of Civil Procedure:
A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times,
statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this can be done
the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of times, places,
and persons present, and he must be allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
him concerning them.
While for present purposes no detailed discussion of the judicial treatment of
section 2052 is necessary, a general understanding of the section is essential before one can fully appreciate the significance of the change which has been made.
Section 2052 authorizes the impeachment of a witness by proving that at
some previous time he has made statements which were inconsistent with those
made by him at the present trial. This type of impeachment is based on the
theory that proof of the witness' self-contradiction demonstrates his capacity to
err either through defective memory or lack of veracity and discredits his credibility before the jury.4 But section 2052 establishes certain prerequisites that
must be met before this mode of impeachment is permitted. The primary limitation requires that before extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement is
admitted, a "foundation" or, as it is sometimes designated, the "preliminary question," 5 must be laid. To establish the foundation the impeaching counsel must
(1) inform the witness of the "times, places, and persons present" when he
allegedly made the prior statements, (2) ask him ff he made the alleged statements, and (3) if he admits having made the alleged statements, permit him to
'Section 770 relates to the impeachment of a witness who testifies at a hearing.
For impeachment of a hearsay declarant whose statement is introduced as evidence, see
CAL. EvroENcE CODE § 1209, which provides that the declarant may be impeached by
evidence of prior inconsistent statements without a foundation having been laid.
2 WrrmN, CAImaroRA EviDmqcE, §§ 1250-51 (2d ed. 1966).
3 See generally, McBAmw, CALFOrNuIA EvrENcE MANUAL, §§ 428-33 (1960); Wrrxm, CALIonNIA EvIDEN E, §§ 661-71 (1st ed. 1958); Hale, Prior Inconsistent Statements, 10 So. CAL. L. REV. 135 (1937); 54 CAL. Jum. 2d, Witnesses §§163-82 (1960).
43 Wx MonE, EvIENcE § 1017, at 684-85 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMoRE].
5
McCoanncx, EvmEcE § 37, at 67 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McComacil;
3 Wigmore § 1025, at 702.
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explain them. 6 Should the witness deny making the statement,7 or answer evasively,8 the impeacher has satisfied the requirement of section 2052 by providing
the witness an opportunity to explain and may introduce extrinsic evidence of
the prior statement at his next stage of presenting evidence. 9 Although there is
some disagreement as to whether the impeacher should be permitted to introduce
extrinsic evidence when the witness admits having made the prior statement,' 0
California seems to hold that such extrinsic evidence must be excluded under
those circumstances."
It should be carefully noted that the foundational requirement, as set forth
in section 2052, applies before the witness can be impeached, i.e. it must precede
the admission of any extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement that
the impeaching counsel might desire to introduce for impeachment purposes. The
usual practice has been for the impeaching counsel to lay the foundation during
his cross-examination of the witness, 12 but a few California cases have held it to
be within the discretion of the trial court to permit the impeaching counsel to
recall the witness and lay the foundation after completion of the cross-examination but prior to introduction of the impeaching evidence.13
The foundational requirement originated in Queen Caroline's Case,14 an
English case of 1820, where it was declared that when the witness' credibility
was going to be challenged by proof of a prior inconsistent statement, the witness
should be asked during his cross-examination whether he had made such a prior
statement. The reasons most often advanced for requiring a foundation have been
(1) to give the witness a fair opportunity to explain, (2) to avoid unfair surprise
to the adversary, and (3) to save time, in that should the witness admit the prior
statement introduction of the impeaching evidence would become unnecessary. 15
Since its inception, the foundational rule has gradually gained almost total
acceptance in this country. 16 While the rule has received the general approval of
most evidence scholars, its rigid application by the courts has been severely
criticized.' 7 When applied too inflexibly by a court the rule may serve to deprive
6CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 2052; People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal. 2d 27, 37, 9 Cal. Rptr.
793, 798, 357 P.2d 1049, 1054 (1960).
7People v. Rushing, 130 Cal. 449, 453, 62 Pac. 742, 743 (1900).
8People v. Singh, 20 Cal. App. 146, 148, 128 Pac. 420, 421 (1912).
9
See Keyes v. Geary St. R.R., 152 Cal. 437, 441, 93 Pac. 88, 89 (1907).
10 Compare McCoBmce § 37, at 68, with 3 WiGmoRE § 1037, at 723.
11 See People v. Sykes, 44 Cal. 2d 166, 172, 280 P.2d 769, 772, cert. denied, 349
U.S. 934 (1955).
12

See, e.g., People v. Singh, 20 Cal. App. 146, 149, 128 Pac. 420, 422 (1912).
People v. Raven, 44 Cal. 2d 523, 526, 282 P.2d 866, 868 (1955); People v. Shaw,
111 Cal. 171, 177, 43 Pac. 593, 594 (1896); People v. Keith, 50 Cal. 137, 140 (1875).
13

142 Brod. & Bing. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820), quoted in 3 WMOP E § 1025,
at 702. This case also established the rule that writings alleged to contain prior inconsistent statements of a witness must be shown to the witness before cross-examining him
concerning them. This rule has been embodied in the second sentence of CAL. CODE Crv.
Paoc. §.2052. Widely criticized as an obstacle to effective cross-examination, the rule has
now been repealed by CAL. Evmn cE CODE § 768.
15
McCow=cK § 37, at 67-68.
16 3 WicmoRE § 1028, at 705.
17 It is always necessary when seeking to determine the attitude of scholars toward
the foundational requirement to distinguish their criticism of the foundational rule for
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an impeacher of the opportunity to introduce impeaching evidence although circumstances have rendered it impossible for him to comply with the foundational
procedure. For example, until People v. Collup's was decided in 1946, several
earlier California cases 19 had held that in the absence of a foundation, extrinsic
evidence must be excluded even though the cross-examiner either was not aware
of the inconsistent statement at the time he cross-examined the witness or the
witness did not make the inconsistent statement until after having been crossexamined and excused. In expressly overturning these cases, the court in Collup
held that since the purpose of the foundational rule is "to get all of the pertinent
evidence before the court and to further test the credibility of the impeachment
*. ."omission of the foundation should not require exclusion of the impeaching
evidence "when it is impossible to lay the foundation." 20 By thus injecting an

element of flexibility into the application of this rule, the California court corrected the rule's most oppressive and criticized feature.
Change Recommended by the Uniform Rules of Evidence
While California, through the Collup decision, had achieved some relaxation
of the unduly rigid application of the foundational rule, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws sought to achieve the same result by way of Uniform Rule
of Evidence 22(b), which states:
Extrinsic evidence of prior contradictory statements, whether oral or written,
made by the witness, may in the discretion of the judge be excluded unless the
witness was so examined while testifying as to give him opportunity to identify,

explain, or deny the statement.
Thus, the uniform rule introduces the element of the "discretion of the judge."
Except in rare instances such as the Collup decision, judges have usually felt
bound to apply the foundational rule arbitrarily.2 ' Specifically granting judges
written inconsistent statements or of the foundational rule when too rigidly applied from
their approval of the foundational rule itself. By failing to make these distinctions,
Witkin provides a somewhat misleading view of the attitude of scholars toward the
foundational rule: "The foundational requirement was criticized as arbitrary and un-

realistic, often working to the disadvantage of the cross-examiner and to the benefit of a
dishonest witness." Wrr=N, CA riomrA EviDENcE, § 1251, at 1153 (2d ed. 1966).
This statement is accurate as it applies to scholars' attitudes toward the rule for written
statements and toward the tendency to apply the foundational rule too severely. But as
to the principle of a foundation, Professor Wigmore, after noting the arguments against
the rule, concludes that "in general the preliminary question should indeed be put,
before producing the alleged contradiction ...." 3 WxaronE § 1027, at 704. Likewise,
as to the foundation principle, Professor McCormick concludes that "the preliminary
question requirement when complied with conduces to fairness and economy of time."
McCou.
.c§ 37, at 70. Lastly, Professor Hale, whose excellent article provides perhaps
the most thorough treatment of this subject, concludes that failure to require a foundation "is not to be commended." Hale, PriorInconsistent Statements, 10 So. CAL. L. Rzv.
135-36 (1937).
1827 Cal. 2d 829, 167 P.2d 714 (1946), 20 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 102.
19 See, e.g., People v. Compton, 132 Cal. 484, 64 Pac. 849 (1901); People v. Greenwell, 20 Cal. App. 2d 266, 66 P.2d 674 (1937), both cases overruled by People v.
Collup, 27 Cal. 2d 829, 167 P.2d 714 (1946).
2027 Cal. 2d 829, 837, 167 P.2d 714, 718 (1946).
2
1 See, e.g., Nagi v. Detroit United By., 231 Mich. 452, 204 N.W. 126 (1925).
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this discretionary power, the uniform rule proceeded along the course most often
22
recommended by evidence writers.
Under the uniform rule the foundational requirement remains essentially intact, for in view of the prior general acceptance of the foundational requirement,
there is little basis for concluding that judges in the exercise of their discretionary
power would not continue to require a foundation in most impeachment situations. 23 For the impeacher intentionally to omit the foundation without some
extenuating circumstance would certainly entail the risk that the judge might
later exclude the impeaching evidence when it is offered.24 On the other hand,
the uniform rule clearly empowers the judge to admit the impeaching evidence
in the absence of a foundation when he deems such admission to be fair. Discretionary admission might be allowed in those situations where it is obviously
impossible for the impeacher to lay a foundation. Discretionary admission might
also be extended to situations in which the impeacher simply overlooks the
foundation but the judge is convinced that the value of the impeaching evidence
outweighs any injustice that the opposing side will suffer through omission of
the foundation.25
The Foundation Requirement as Modified by Section 770
Utilizing Uniform Rule of Evidence 22(b) as a starting point, the California
Law Revision Commission eventually formulated the following rule which was
enacted into law as Evidence Code section 770:
Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a statement
made by a witness that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the
hearing shall be excluded unless:
(a) The witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement; or
(b) The witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the
action.
Comparison of this text with that of the uniform rule reveals several highly significant changes.
Whereas the uniform rule had provided for discretionary exclusion of extrinsic
The court here affrmed the lower court's denial of a motion by the defendant for a
new trial, although one of the plaintiff's witnesses, before committing suicide, had
written the defendant a letter in which he admitted that the plaintiff had paid him to
testify falsely in the trial. In denying the motion, the lower court held that if a new
trial were granted the letter would not be admissible to impeach the earlier testimony
of the deceased witness because no foundation could possibly be laid.
22 See McComacx § 37, at 70; 3 WiGMonE § 1025, at 705; Hale, PriorInconsistent
Statements, 10 So. CAL. L. REv. 135, 164 (1937).
23 See Memorandum 63-43 of the California Law Revision Commission, August 16,
1963 (unpublished memorandum in the office of the California Law Revision Commission, School of Law, Stanford University.) This document describes Uniform Rule 22(b)

as "in accord with the present mandatory foundation requirement . . . [but that it]

transfers direction into discretion." See also De Parcq, The Uniform Rules of EvidenceA Plaintiff's View, 40 MwN. L. RBv. 301, 320-22 (1956); Holbrook, Witnesses, 2
U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 32, 40-41 (1954).
24 Holbrook, supranote 22, at 41.
25 McCoWM~C

§ 37, at 70.
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evidence if the foundational requirement bad not been met before the impeaching evidence was introduced, section 770, except in the interests of justice, requires exclusion of the extrinsic evidence if the witness has neither (a) bad the
benefit of a foundation during his testimony, nor (b) been held to give further
testimony in the action. This latter alternative is by far the most striking innovation presented by the new rule, for, unlike the uniform rule, which gave the judge*
discretionary power to require a foundation, the new California rule gives the
impeacher the power to determine whether a foundation will or will not be laid.
Insofar as an impeaching counsel elects to follow subsection (b), he may now
ignore any foundation during his examination of the witness, excuse the witness
subject to recall at a later time, and proceed to introduce his impeaching evidence before the witness has even been informed that an alleged inconsistency
exists.
There are other differences between the Uniform Rule 22(b) and section 770.
The phrase "oral or written" used to modify "statements" in the uniform rule
was deleted in section 770, but "statement" is defined in the Evidence Code to
include oral or written verbal expression. 26 Secondly, whereas the uniform rule
referred to an "opportunity to identify, explain, or deny," subsection 770 (a)
omits the word "identify" and refers only to "explain or deny." This change was
introduced after study failed to reveal any case in which merely permitting the
witness to "identify" the previous inconsistent statement constituted a satisfactory
27
foundation.
Evaluation of the "Interests of Justice" Clause
The addition of the "interests of justice" clause, as explained in the comment
to section 770, will permit admission of extrinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement even though the witness was not afforded an opportunity to explain the
statement during his testimony and even though he has been excused from giving
further testimony. Such a situation might occur when the cross-examiner, being
unaware of a witness' prior inconsistent statement at the time of the crossexamination, fails either to lay a foundation or to request that the witness remain
available for recall. When the cross-examiner later learns of the statement and
desires to present extrinsic evidence of the statement for impeachment purposes,
the judge may in the "interests of justice" admit the evidence although the requirements of neither subsection (a) nor (b) have been met. Similarly, if the
witness had never made an inconsistent statement prior to the time of the crossexamination, but he does so subsequent to being cross-examined and excused
from the trial, the judge may in the "interests of justice' permit the party against
whom the witness was presented to introduce extrinsic evidence of the subsequent inconsistent statement when neither subsection (a) nor (b) has been followed. Since the Collup decision had already relaxed the foundational requirement
"when it is impossible to lay the foundation," the "interests of justice" clause,
26 CA. EvIDmENCE CODE § 225: "'Statement' means (a) oral or written verbal expression or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for oral
or written
verbal expression."
2
7 Memorandum 64-81 of the California Law Revision Commission, October 27,
1964 (unpublished memorandum in the office of the California Law Revision Conmission, School of Law, Stanford University.)
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although broader in its potential application, would appear to represent no major
change in the law.
The operative effect of the "interests of justice" clause could conceivably
confuse some readers. Does the "interests of justice" clause operate only to qualify
the rule of exclusion which immediately follows it, or does it also operate on subsections (a) and (b) to render inadmissible some extrinsic evidence which has
qualified for admission through compliance with either of those subsections? Put
another way, could there be situations in which a judge might in the "interests
of justice" disallow extrinsic evidence which the impeacher had qualified for
admission either by laying a proper foundation or by insuring that the witness
remained available for recall?28
Support for the contention that the "interests of justice" clause applies to
subsections (a) and (b) as well as to the rule of exclusion immediately following
the clause might be derived from its position at the very outset of the section.
This position coupled with the weight of the words "interests of justice," gives
the impression that the clause qualifies all that follows it. On closer examination,
however, it appears more probable that the "interests of justice" clause is intended to qualify only the exclusionary statement which immediately follows it.
In the first place, the thrust of the Evidence Code is to make all relevant evidence
admissible. 29 Secondly, the major defect of the foundational requirement has been
that by applying it too rigidly courts have excluded evidence which erstwhile
impeachers rightfully should have been allowed to introduce in the absence of
a foundation. 0 To correct this defect, Uniform Rule 22(b) granted the judge
discretionary power to waive the foundation. 31 Since the "interests of justice"
clause is a standard substituted for the discretionary element of the uniform
rule,82 it may reasonably be concluded that the "interests of justice" clause was
intended to continue the trend toward admissibility and was not intended to
permit exclusion of evidence which had qualified for admission through compliance with subsections (a) or (b). This conclusion finds further support in the
comment to section 770, which declares that "the court may permit extrinsic
evidence of an inconsistent statement to be admitted even though the witness
has been excused. .. ,,33 It seems highly probable that if the "interests of justice"
clause had been intended to qualify subsections (a) and (b) by permitting exclusion of evidence that had qualified for admission through compliance with
either of those subsections, the comment to section 770 would have noted this
broader application.
If it is true that the "interests of justic&' clause was designed to qualify only
28

An affirmative answer to this question might give rise to the possibility that the
proponent of the witness would under some circumstances move to strike the extrinsic
evidence in the "interests of justice." For a further discussion of this possibility see the
text accompanying note 45 infra.
29 See CAr. EVIDENcE CODE § 351.
30 See, e.g., McCoimacx § 37, at 70; 3 WIGMOnE § 1027, at 704-5; Hale, Prior
Inconsistent Statements, 10 So. CAL. L. REv. 135, 164 (1937).
31 Wrrn, CAr.jronqrA EvmN.cE § 669, at 707 (1st ed. 1958).
32
See Memoranda 64-45, July 20, 1964, and 64-54, August 7, 1964, of the Califor-

nia Law Revision Commission (unpublished memoranda in the office of the California
Law Revision Commission, School of Law, Stanford University.)
38 CAL. EvmENcz CoDE

§ 770, comment (Emphasis added.)
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the rule of exclusion immediately following it, i.e. that it operates as a rule of
admissibility to allow such evidence as would otherwise be excluded from a
failure or inability to observe subsections (a) or (b), then the "interests of justice" clause stands on an equal footing with subsections (a) and (b) rather than
in a position superior to them. Section 770 thus states three situations in which
extrinsic evidence may be admitted: (1) where the witness has been permitted
to explain or to deny the inconsistency at the time he testifies; (2) where the
right to recall the witness later to give further testimony has been reserved; or
(3) where the interests of justice require admission.
The foregoing analysis of the "interests of justice" clause suggests that the
syntax of section 770 is not arranged to the best advantage of the reader. The
"unless" clause at the outset, followed by a positive rule of exclusion, followed in
turn by another "unless," requires a series of mental turnabouts that are not conducive to ease of comprehension. Since the "interests of justice" clause is only
another qualification of the positive rule of exclusion, this clause ought to be
simply a third subsection. Such a change would result in one positive rule of
exclusion followed by three qualifying subsections. Still greater clarity would be
achieved by having all subsections phrased positively, rather than the present
mixture of the positive phrasing of subsection (a) and the negative phrasing of
subsection (b). Under this recommendation, section 770, without any loss of
content, would read as follows:
Extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness that is inconsistent with
any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded unless:
(a) The witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement; or
(b) The witness has been only conditionally excused and remains subject to
giving further testimony in the action; or
(c) The interests of justice otherwise require admission of the extrinsic evidence.
Advantages of the Modified Rule
Most of the merits of the new rule are well summarized in the comment to
section 770. First of all, it is suggested that it will prove equally advantageous
to permit the witness to explain the inconsistent statement after it has been introduced into evidence. Secondly, when witnesses are suspected of acting collusively, it will be possible under the modified rule to cross-examine and impeach
them by using the prior inconsistent statement of any one of them. 34 Under the
mandatory foundational rule this tactic would not have -been possible because
disclosure of the inconsistent statement during the foundation would have forewarned the other collusive witnesses and enabled them to avoid inconsistency by
testifying in conformity with the prior statement. A third advantage of the modified rule is that through the addition of the "interests of justice" clause, the new
rule permits admission of extrinsic evidence where the witness has been excused
without having had the opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistent statement.
Still another apparent advantage of the new rule that is not discussed in the
comment to section 770 but seems to follow as a matter of course is that by elect34 See Minutes of the California Law Revision Commission meeting, September
29-24, 1963, on fie at the office of the California Law Revision Commission, School of
Law, Stanford University.
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ing to follow the new alternative, instead of laying a foundation, the impeaching
counsel will avoid any risk that during the foundation the witness might admit
the inconsistent statement and thereby deprive the impeacher of the opportunity
to introduce extrinsic evidence of the statement. If the impeacher's extrinsic evidence is from an impressive source, he may much rather get this evidence before
the jury than to gain a mere admission of inconsistency from the impeached
witness.3 5
A further advantage to be noted is that when under subsection (a) a foundation is utilized in the future, there is no longer any prescribed formula equivalent
to "times, places, and persons present" that must be related to the witness. It
would now seem that a satisfactory foundation can be achieved by describing
the occasion of the alleged prior statement to the witness in any manner that
adequately serves to refresh his memory.
Criticism of the Modified Rule
Before proceeding with a discussion of the disadvantages of section 770, it
should be emphasized that trials are conducted for the purpose of determining
truth, and rules of evidence must be adopted that will contribute to the attainment of that objective. Since rules pertaining to impeachment are designed to
expose untruthful witnesses, it is only when two or more alternative procedures
are equally effective to expose false testimony that secondary considerations, such
as saving the court's time or being fair to the witness, should carry any weight.
But quite properly the common law has established limitations on this principle,
for modem trials do not pursue a truth-at-any-cost approach. In other words,
there would seem to come a point where secondary considerations may warrant
the erection of obstacles in the path of a trial lawyer. Poised in terms of impeachment of witnesses by inconsistent statements, section 770 represents a determination by California legislators that an untruthful witness may be more effectively
exposed by not requiring that he be informed of an alleged inconsistent statement
in advance of its introduction in evidence. By contrast, the widespread acceptance of the traditional foundational requirement suggests that most authorities 6
have considered either that a foundation in no way hindered the exposure of
false testimony, or, if there were any hindrance, that the advantages of the
foundational requirement outweighed whatever obstacles were thereby presented
to the impeacher. To what extent then are the advantages of the foundational
requirement also present in the modified rule of section 770?
The foundational requirement has often been described as a time-saving device in that an admission by a witness of a prior inconsistent statement would
obviate introduction of the extrinsic evidence.37 Insofar as an impeacher elects
under the new rule to dispense with the foundation and to present his extrinsic
evidence directly, time will be lost both in the introduction of the extrinsic evidence and in recalling the impeached witness to hear his explanation. This arguS5 This possible advantage of the modified rule was suggested in an interview with
Mr. Jon D. Smock, Attorney, Califomia Judicial Council, in San Francisco, California,
September
1966.
3
6See, e.g., McComrxcx § 37, at 70; 3 WiGMorm § 1027, at 705; Hale, Prior Inconsistent
Statements, 10 So. CAL. L. BEv. 135 (1937).
3
7 E.g., McCoRIUcK § 37, at 67-68.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

ment is of course based on the presupposition that the witness would have
admitted the statement had a foundation been laid; otherwise, the criticism is
inappropriate.
Another reason often given for the foundational requirement has been to
prevent unfair surprise to one's adversary.38 As explained by Professor Wigmore,
there is no means by which the proponent of a witness can come to court prepared to refute a claim of self-contradiction that may be made against his witness.
Advance warning is, however, provided him through the foundation procedure
when the cross-examiner informs the witness of the times, places, and circumstances at which he allegedly made the prior inconsistent statements. Thus
informed, the proponent of the witness can prepare to refute the claim of inconsistency.3 9
It is true that the new procedure enacted in section 770 will preserve some
particle of the warning feature, for the action by the impeaching counsel in excusing the witness subject to recall should alert the proponent of the witness to
the possibility of an impeachment attempt. But such a warning will be of questionable benefit because, unlike the foundational procedure, it will not reveal the
precise circumstances in which the witness may have made the prior inconsistent
statement. Forewarned only by the request of the cross-examiner to recall the
witness at a later time, the best that the proponent of the witness will be able to
accomplish by way of preparation is to encourage the witness to recollect when
and where he may have uttered a prior inconsistent statement; otherwise, the
proponent will have to wait patiently for the extrinsic evidence to be presented
so that he may learn the circumstances of the alleged prior statement. Only then
will he be sufficiently enlightened to begin preparing his refutation.
Probably the most common justification advanced for the existence of the
foundational requirement has been fairness to the witness. As the matter was
stated by one early writer:
This course of proceeding is considered indispensable, from a sense of justice to
the witness; for as the direct tendency of the evidence is to impeach his veracity,
common justice requires that, by first calling his attention to the subject, he
should have an opportunity to recollect the facts, and, if necessary, to correct
the statement already given . . .40
The comment to section 770 challenges this proposition by the assertion that
"there is no compelling reason to provide the opportunity for explanation before
the inconsistent statement is introduced in evidence." While it is obviously true
that fairness to the witness cannot be accorded the status of a "compelling reason," the fact remains that a vast majority of courts and writers have for generations considered it a highly persuasive reason. 41 Perhaps this conclusion was
reached on the assumption that if the witness were not given an opportunity to
3

8E.g., People v. Collup, 27 Cal. 2d 829, 837, 167 P.2d 714, 718 (1946).

39 3 WIGMORE § 1019, at 690.
40 1 GnmqiE&F, EvmErcE § 462, at 592 (16th ed. 1899).
41 See, e.g., People v. Collup, 27 Cal. 2d 829, 837, 167 P.2d 714, 718 (1946);
People v. Nonella, 99 Cal. 333, 335, 33 Pac. 1097, 1098 (1893); Rignell v. Font, 90
Cal. App. 730, 737, 266 Pac. 588, 591 (1928); People v. Singh, 20 Cal. App. 146, 148,
128 Pac. 420, 422 (1912); McComucx § 37, at 70; 3 WiGmORE § 1027, at 704 and

§ 1028, at 705; Hale, PriorInconsistent Statements, 10 So. CAL. L. lREv. 135-36 (1937).
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explain during his cross-examination, or at some other point prior to introduction
of the impeaching evidence, there would be a substantial risk that he might leave
court and not be available for subsequent recall. 42 If this was the consideration
that prompted the foundational requirement, section 770 provides that the witness may be excused subject to being recalled, and the charge of unfairness is
thus rendered inapplicable. If, on the other hand, courts and writers have thought
it more fair that a witness should first have the opportunity to explain his inconsistent remarks before they are presented to the jury in a manner clearly designed
to disparage his credibility, then the new alternative of permitting the witness to
later, after the impeaching evidence has been presented, is plainly less
explain
fair.43
Unfortunately, authorities writing on this subject have so often taken the
foundational procedure as a basic proposition that they have neglected to discuss
why it is necessarily more fair to allow the witness to explain before, rather than
after, his alleged inconsistent statements are introduced in evidence. Professor
Greenleaf, as quoted above, simply attributed the propriety of a foundation to
"common justice."
It would appear in light of the foregoing discussion that whether it is equally
fair to permit a witness to explain his inconsistent statement after extrinsic evidence of the statement has already been introduced, or whether this opportunity
should precede introduction of the statement, is a question that must be answered
subjectively. At least one factor to be considered in arriving at any conclusion is
the ability of a witness against whom impeaching evidence has been introduced
to reestablish himself in the eyes of the jurors. 44 While the effect of the extrinsic
evidence on the jury may be highly speculative, it should be recognized that
several days may elapse between the time the extrinsic evidence is introduced
and the time when the impeached witness may be recalled for his explanation.
Given such time to crystallize, it is questionable whether the jury's estimation of
the witness can be restored to its former status by his belated explanation. Conceivably, the jury may be even more prone to discount the belated explanation
knowing that the witness has had the opportunity to confer with counsel after
evidence of the inconsistent statement was presented.
Recalling the Impeached Witness
Until judges and lawyers become accilstomed to the modified procedure of
section 770, there may be some disagreement as to which party, if any, is under
an obligation to recall an impeached witness for the purpose of providing him
with an opportunity to explain an alleged inconsistent statement. For the purpose
of discussion, let it be supposed that an attorney whose witness has been impeached takes the position that it is the impeacher who must return the impeached witness to the stand to permit him to explain his alleged inconsistent
statement. Since under the traditional foundational requirement the impeacher
carried the burden of permitting the witness to explain or deny his alleged prior
42

See, e.g., Downer v. Dana, 19 Vt 338, 345 (1847), quoted in 3 Wxcamoim
§ 1027,
at 704.
43
See, e.g., fignell v. Font, 90 Cal. App. 730, 737, 266 Pac. 588, 591 (1928).
4
4 This objection to the modified rule was expressed by Mr. Ingemar E. Hoberg,
a San Francisco trial attorney in an interview conducted at his office in September 1966.
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statement before extrinsic evidence of the statement could be admitted, why,
under the modified rule, would not the impeacher carry a similar burden of recalling the witness to permit him to explain after extrinsic evidence of the inconsistent statement has been received? If the impeacher fails to so recall the
witness, why might not the proponent of the witness, rather than himself attempting to rehabilitate the witness, move to strike the extrinsic evidence from the
record on the ground that the "interests of justice" so require?45
The most obvious answer to this question of which side must recall the witness is that section 770 does not require either side to do so. It merely requires
that the witness not have been excused from giving further testimony in the
action. Therefore, when the impeacher excuses a witness subject to recall he has
complied with subsection (b) and has qualified for admission whatever extrinsic
evidence of the prior inconsistent statement he wishes to present. Thereafter,
section 770 places no duty upon him with respect to the impeached witness. This
circumstance suggests that if the impeached witness is to be recalled, it is the
proponent of the witness who will usually have to undertake the recall,46 for it

is he who stands to benefit from the witness' rehabilitation and it is he who is in
the best position to determine whether an effort at rehabilitation would be futile
in the face of the impeaching evidence. 4 7 While the following remarks were made
in a study of the Uniform Rule 22(b) rather than in reference to section 770,
they describe a situation quite similar to that under discussion:
If a person testifies as a witness at the hearing and if one of the parties proposes
to prove a statement uttered by the witness on another occasion inconsistent with
his testimony, it is, of course, possible to give the witness an 'opportunity to
identify, explain or deny the statement,' in the language of Rule 22(b). Assuming
the witness remains available throughout the hearing, he can be afforded such
opportunity at some point prior to the conclusion of the hearing. Conceivably,
the actual affording of such opportunity could be left up to the party supported
by the witness. Conceivably, the party seeking to impeach could be permitted to
introduce his evidence regarding an inconsistent statement without making any
inquiries of the witness. The other party could then decide whether to recall the
witness and give him opportunity to deny the pretrial statement or to admit it
and explain it. Under this scheme, the party supported by the witness would, of
course, run the risk that the witness may become unavailable for recall (because,
for example, of death or disappearance) 48
45

This possible application of the modified rule was suggested by Messrs. Ingemar
E. Hoberg and Marvin E. Lewis, both practicing trial attorneys in San Francisco, in
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conducted at their offices in September 1966.
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This conclusion does not eliminate the possibility of the impeacher recalling the
impeached witness if he chooses to do so; it is only suggested here that he would not
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This conclusion was stated by Professors J. Warren Madden and Judson F.
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the impeacher does have an obligation to recall the impeached witness to permit him
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Conclusion
Thoughtful consideration of the modified foundational rule enacted in section
770 may lead to the conclusion that it will produce more ills than it will cure.
Aside from the questions of draftsmanship and interpretation, there persists the
more basic question as to the abandonment of the foundation as a required procedure. If there is any merit in the traditional justifications of that requirementfairness to the witness, saving time, preventing unfair surprise to the adversary
-is there greater merit in the advantages attributed to the new rule?
How demonstrably advantageous is the modified foundational rule? It is said
that it is equally fair to permit the witness to explain his inconsistent statement
after it has been introduced into evidence by the impeacher. 49 This proposition,
against which the great weight of authority stands,5 0 is neutral in character; it
provides no positive argument for modifying the foundational requirement or for
retaining it in its traditional form. It is further said that the modified rule, through
the "interests of justice" clause, will permit admissibility of extrinsic evidence of
an inconsistent statement when the witness has been excused and has had no
opportunity to explain or to deny the statement. 51 While it is true that some
flexibility of this nature is desirable, such relaxation of the foundational requirement bad already been partially achieved in California through the Collup decision, and it was wholly attainable through adoption of the discretionary rule
stated in Uniform Rule 22(b). Yet another possible advantage of the modified
rule is that by not requiring a foundation there will no longer be any obstacle
to prevent the impeacher from gaining introduction of extrinsic evidence of the
inconsistent statement. But this development is only advantageous to the impeacher; it leaves unsettled the issue of whether he should be granted such an
advantage in the absence of any similar concession to the party whose witness is
being impeached. Lastly, it is stated that the modified rule will permit more
effective impeachment of collusive witnesses. 52 Although this feature seems to be
the most advantageous of all the reasons suggested, there is nothing to indicate
that this objective was of such common occurrence or fundamental importance as
to necessitate abandonment of the traditional rule, nor is it clear that this objective could not have been achieved by adoption of the discretionary Uniform
Rule 22(b). It is submitted that California might have better protected the interests of all parties to a trial by adopting the discretionary Uniform Rule 22(b)
for the admission of extrinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement.
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